Tag: CMAR

  • CMAR Is the Most Misunderstood Model in Progressive Contracting — Here’s How It Actually Works

    What CMAR Actually Is

    Construction Manager at Risk is the progressive contract model I managed hands-on during the Bowmanville Train Line Extension — a $2 billion rail extension in Ontario, Canada, delivered under one of the most ambitious CMAR engagements in North American transit history.

    The model is two-phased, and understanding both phases is essential to understanding why CMAR produces the outcomes it does — both the successes and the failure modes.

    Phase 1: Preconstruction

    The owner selects a Construction Manager based on qualifications and fee — explicitly not on lowest bid price. This is the first and most important distinction from traditional contracting. The CM is chosen for who they are and what they can contribute during design, not for how aggressively they will price the work at tender.

    Once engaged, the CM joins the design process as an active participant. Their core preconstruction deliverables are constructability reviews (applying field construction knowledge to design decisions before they are locked), cost estimating (building and maintaining an open-book estimate of the project as design evolves), value engineering (identifying alternative approaches that reduce cost or improve buildability without compromising the owner’s requirements), schedule development (building a construction schedule that reflects how the project will actually be built, not a theoretical programme), risk identification (surfacing and quantifying construction risks while there is still time and design flexibility to mitigate them), and procurement planning (identifying long-lead materials and subcontracting strategies that reduce cost and schedule risk).

    This phase is where the value of CMAR is created. The contractor’s field knowledge shapes the design before it gets locked in. Problems that would have become change orders in traditional contracting get solved collaboratively during preconstruction.

    Phase 2: GMP and Construction

    When the design reaches sufficient maturity — typically 60-90% complete, depending on the project type and the owner’s tolerance for residual uncertainty — the CM and owner negotiate a Guaranteed Maximum Price. The GMP is built on transparent, open-book cost data: the actual cost of the work (labour, materials, subcontractors, equipment), plus the CM’s fixed fee (typically 3-8% of cost of work), plus shared contingency.

    The financial logic of the GMP is based on transparency and shared risk. If the project comes in under the GMP, the savings are shared between owner and CM in a pre-agreed ratio — this is the ‘gain.’ If the project exceeds the GMP, the CM absorbs the overage — this is the ‘pain.’ This structure fundamentally changes the CM’s incentive compared to traditional contracting. They are now motivated to find efficiencies and avoid problems, not to identify claim opportunities.

    What Conditions CMAR Requires

    CMAR is not a magic fix for construction delivery. It is a model with specific conditions that need to be in place for it to perform. When those conditions are absent, CMAR can actually underperform traditional contracting — because you have added cost and time without getting the collaborative benefit.

    The owner needs to be capable of active participation in preconstruction. An owner who treats the preconstruction phase as a contractor activity to be observed rather than a collaborative process to be participated in will not get the benefit of early contractor involvement. The design decisions that preconstruction is supposed to inform get made without the CM’s input, and the preconstruction becomes a billing exercise.

    The CM needs to have real preconstruction capability — not just estimators who can produce a GMP, but constructability specialists, procurement strategists, and schedule analysts who can genuinely contribute to design development. A general contractor who wants early access to a project but has thin preconstruction capability will deliver thin preconstruction value.

    The governance structure needs to allow fast decision-making. One of the most persistent failure modes I saw in CMAR delivery was an owner’s governance framework designed for traditional procurement — sequential decisions, multi-committee approval — meeting a contract model that required collaborative, fast decisions during preconstruction. The friction was immediate and ongoing. The contract’s potential was constrained by the governance.

    The contract needs clear GMP amendment procedures. CMAR does not freeze scope at GMP establishment. When the owner adds scope or conditions change, the GMP needs to be adjusted through a clear, pre-agreed process. Ambiguity in this process is the single most common source of CMAR disputes I have observed.

    What Goes Right and What Goes Wrong

    When these conditions are in place, CMAR produces outcomes that traditional contracting consistently fails to achieve: cost certainty at GMP establishment, fewer change orders during construction, faster problem resolution, and a project team that functions as a partnership rather than an adversarial relationship.

    When the conditions are absent — and they often are, particularly on first CMAR engagements — the model creates overhead without creating value. I will continue to share specific failure modes from my experience in coming articles, because understanding what goes wrong is as important as understanding what the model is designed to do.

  • The Construction Industry Has a $1.6 Trillion Problem — And Traditional Contracting Is Making It Worse

    The Productivity Crisis in Construction

    McKinsey’s research on global construction productivity is worth sitting with. Large construction projects typically take 20% longer than planned and run up to 80% over budget. The World Economic Forum puts global construction productivity growth at just 1% annually over the past 20 years — while manufacturing has grown at 3.6% over the same period. The construction industry manages approximately $10 trillion of economic activity annually, and its fundamental inefficiency is one of the most significant and underaddressed productivity problems in the global economy.

    The causes of this underperformance are multiple and interconnected. But one structural factor stands above the others: how we contract.

    What Traditional Contracting Does to Projects

    The Design-Bid-Build model — owner designs, contractor bids lowest price, adversarial relationship ensues — was developed in an era when construction projects were simpler, supply chains were local, and the pace of design development was slow enough that a complete design before bidding was achievable and meaningful.

    None of those conditions reliably apply to large infrastructure programs today. Designs are complex and interdependent. Supply chains span continents. The world changes between schematic design and construction completion in ways that no set of contract documents can fully anticipate.

    The traditional model’s response to this complexity is to push risk onto the contractor through fixed-price lump sum contracting. The assumption is that competition at tender will produce an efficient price, and that forcing the contractor to absorb risk will make them manage it efficiently. In practice, the assumption fails regularly.

    Fixed-price contracting on complex infrastructure does not eliminate risk. It relocates it — to the contractor’s contingency, to the claims and disputes process, and ultimately to the schedule and budget outcomes that the owner cares about most. A contractor who has absorbed risks they cannot manage will not manage them efficiently. They will manage them legally, through change orders and claims that shift liability back to the owner at the worst possible time.

    What Progressive Models Change

    The defining characteristic of progressive contract models — CMAR, Alliance, PDB, ECI, and IPD — is that they bring the contractor into the project before the design is complete, under terms that align their financial interests with project outcomes rather than against them.

    Construction Manager at Risk engages the contractor during design under an open-book preconstruction agreement, culminating in a Guaranteed Maximum Price negotiated on the basis of real cost data rather than competitive desperation. Alliance Contracting creates a single entity from owner, designer, and contractor with a shared risk/reward pool that eliminates the claims dynamic entirely. Progressive Design-Build selects the delivery team on qualifications and develops scope and cost collaboratively before the price is locked. Early Contractor Involvement brings field expertise into planning before the design is committed. Integrated Project Delivery ties the financial outcomes of all parties to the project’s performance against shared targets.

    Each model addresses the same underlying problem — the adversarial, information-poor, incentive-misaligned dynamic of traditional contracting — through a different structural mechanism.

    The Global Shift

    The adoption of progressive models is accelerating globally. Australia pioneered Alliance contracting for infrastructure and has three decades of institutional experience with it. The UK is rebuilding its PPP framework after the political collapse of PFI. Canada has adopted CMAR and Progressive Design-Build for transit delivery, with Metrolinx’s programs among the most ambitious implementations. The GCC is deploying PPP models across 98+ projects in Saudi Arabia alone, with a National Privatization Strategy targeting 220 transactions by 2030.

    The shift is real, and the evidence base supporting it is growing. But the honest version of this story — which I will continue to tell in this series — includes the failure modes. Not every progressive model works in every situation. Picking the wrong model, or applying the right model without the governance, stakeholder readiness, and organizational capability it requires, can produce outcomes worse than traditional contracting.

    The coming weeks of this series will break down each model, examine global case studies of both success and failure, and provide a framework for selecting and implementing progressive contracting in the Saudi and GCC context. This is the honest version. Not the sales pitch.

  • From Canadian Rail to Saudi Arabia: 20 Years in Infrastructure and What I’ve Learned

    Twenty Years in Infrastructure: An Honest Account

    Twenty years in infrastructure teaches you that most project failures are not engineering failures. They are relationship failures, contract failures, and governance failures dressed up as engineering problems.

    I started my career in Ontario’s construction industry in 2004 as a co-op student through Seneca College’s Civil Engineering Technology program. My first site was a municipal road reconstruction in the Region of Peel — nothing glamorous, but it was the beginning of understanding how physical infrastructure actually gets built versus how it gets planned.

    Over the following decade, I worked my way through progressively complex projects — road widenings in Brampton, highway rehabilitation programs for the Ministry of Transportation Ontario, TTC rehabilitation contracts in Toronto, and eventually rail corridor expansion for Metrolinx through Fermar Paving. By the time I was managing a $110 million Stouffville Rail Corridor Track Expansion as Senior Project Manager, I had sat on both sides of the owner-contractor relationship enough times to understand why it so frequently becomes adversarial.

    The Rail Projects That Shaped My Thinking

    My years at Fermar Paving shaped my understanding of what it takes to deliver complex rail infrastructure on time and within budget. The Georgetown South Track Grading project — $100 million of earthworks, underground servicing, and rail construction on an active GO-Metrolinx corridor — required coordination with CN Rail, compliance with Canadian Rail Operating Rules, and management of a team and subcontractors across multiple simultaneous work fronts.

    The Stouffville Rail Corridor Track Expansion that followed was more complex still. $110 million. Double-tracking an active commuter rail corridor while maintaining passenger service. The design staging plan I inherited had unnecessary crossovers that were adding time and cost. I reorganized the staging, reduced the number of crossovers required, and achieved substantial completion on schedule. That project taught me that constructability — the field knowledge that tells you which design assumptions won’t survive contact with actual ground conditions — is where contractor value gets created or wasted.

    The Barrie Double Track Expansion was another lesson in schedule complexity. $80 million of rail construction with interdependencies that required continuous schedule analysis, what-if scenarios, and recovery planning. I was Project Scheduler on that program, and it built in me a discipline around critical path thinking that has informed every program I’ve managed since.

    Moving Into the Owner’s Chair

    Joining Metrolinx as a project manager in 2022 changed my perspective fundamentally. After spending nearly a decade delivering projects for contractors, I was now sitting on the other side of the table — representing the owner on programs worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

    The Georgetown Train Station Accessibility and Rehabilitation project was my first major delivery role at Metrolinx. $150 million. Accessibility upgrades and full station rehabilitation. The most valuable thing I did on that project wasn’t the project management itself — it was a value engineering analysis that eliminated scope elements that weren’t serving the project’s business case, reducing the overall budget by 10%. And changing the pedestrian crossing design from a tunnel to a bridge, which cut cost by 15%, schedule by 30%, and risk by 20%.

    What I also learned was that owner governance — the systems through which an organization makes decisions, approves changes, and manages risk — has an enormous effect on project outcomes. When governance is designed for a traditional procurement environment but a progressive contract model is being used, the friction between the two is immediate and persistent.

    The Bowmanville Extension and the CMAR Experience

    The Bowmanville Train Line Extension — a $2 billion rail extension on Canada’s busiest commuter corridor — became the central experience of my time at Metrolinx. Delivered under a Construction Manager at Risk model, it was one of the most ambitious progressive contracting engagements attempted in North American transit delivery.

    As Manager, and then Acting Senior Manager, I was the primary owner’s representative within the CMAR relationship. I managed the commercial framework, led GMP negotiations, supervised a team of project managers and coordinators, and provided regular reporting to Metrolinx leadership on program performance. I also discovered, through hard experience, every challenge that the CMAR model creates when an owner’s governance framework isn’t designed to keep pace with the collaborative decision-making the contract requires.

    The Move to Riyadh

    In early 2025, my family and I relocated to Riyadh. It was not an impulsive decision. Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure pipeline — $196 billion in contract awards in 2025 alone, a National Privatization Strategy targeting 220 P3 transactions by 2030, and Vision 2030 programs at a scale I had never encountered in Canada — represented the most significant infrastructure delivery challenge of my generation.

    I’m building Concept Dash’s presence in the Kingdom as Chief Business Development Officer for the MENA region. We offer infrastructure PMO services, BIM and digital twin capability, and OT cybersecurity services through our partnership with a NACSA-licensed cybersecurity firm. The Saudi market is more sophisticated, more ambitious, and more analytically demanding than I expected. The recalibration has been ongoing and genuinely educational.

    This blog is where I share what I learn — from 20 years of field experience and from the ongoing education of building a business in the GCC’s most dynamic market.